Managed Investment Scheme regulation: lessons from the Great Southern failure

In April/May 2009, two large ASX-listed companies which dominated the agri-business Managed Investment Scheme sector were placed into administration, leading to significant losses for investors in those companies and the schemes they operated. We provide a concise overview of the demise of one of these companies, Great Southern Limited, to identify a number of inadequacies in current investor protection arrangements.

SINCE THE LATE 1990s, agribusiness Managed Investment Schemes (MISs) have been a popular form of investment for many retail investors, partly motivated by special tax concessions. ASIC (2009) reports that in July 2009 there were 371 licensed agribusiness schemes, of which 198 were forestry (plantations) and the remainder were primarily horticultural, and that around $8 billion had been raised from 75,000 investors since the introduction of the Managed Investments Act in 1998.

The collapse within the space of one month, in April/May 2009, of two of the largest operators of such schemes (Great Southern and Timbercorp), accounting for around 40% of the industry, sparked a Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry (PJC 2009a). That report made three recommendations. The first was that the Government consider changing taxation arrangements to only allow tax deductions from investments in non-forestry schemes to be offset against future income from those schemes. The second was that ASIC be empowered to appoint a new manager (known as a Responsible Entity (RE)) when an MIS is placed in administration. The third recommendation was that qualifications of experts providing opinions on scheme performance be required to be disclosed. While there is much discussion of investor protection issues, no recommendations were made and those matters were considered more broadly in the committee’s contemporaneous inquiry into financial products and services (PJC 2009b).

We believe that investor protection issues arising from these agribusiness failures warrant closer examination of the Great Southern failure, as provided below.

The next section provides a brief overview of agribusiness MISs, and this is followed by an overview of Great Southern’s activities and failure, which is used to identify a number of investor protection issues discussed in the subsequent section. Among those issues, which are not considered in PJC (2009b), are the suitability of the Responsible Entity regime for agribusiness (and more generally), disclosure to investors and the desirability of the RE providing or arranging loans for investors to participate in its schemes.

Agribusiness MISs

A Managed Investment Scheme (MIS) receives and pools funds from investors and provides them with a pro-rata share of the benefits arising from use of those funds through investment in such things as securities, property, or business ventures. Investors do not have day-to-day control over the operations of the scheme, which is held by the scheme manager (who creates and promotes the scheme). All (including agribusiness) MISs operate under the Managed Investments Act 1998 regime, which introduced the concept of the Responsible Entity (RE) as the promoter and manager of the scheme. The RE must be a public company meeting minimum capital requirements, have an appropriate Australian Financial Services
Licence, and its officers are required to act in the best interests of investors in the MIS, and to treat all investors equally. For large REs, there is no requirement to appoint a separate asset Custodian.

Agribusiness forestry MIS investors make an upfront payment with any shortfall relative to operating costs over the life of the scheme met by the RE and deducted from the proceeds of the (far distant) harvest distributed pro-rata to investors (when the scheme terminates). Non-forestry MIS investments, where regular harvests generate an income stream, generally require both an upfront payment and annual payments.

The land involved is owned or leased by the RE and sub-leased to investors in the MIS. Figure 1 illustrates the typical structure of an agribusiness MIS.

Under the MIA 1998, there is no requirement for funds subscribed by investors in a particular MIS to be ‘ring-fenced’, and funds received by different MI schemes operated by the one RE are ultimately transferred to the RE or its parent company. Thus, any invested funds remaining after the costs of establishing trees etc., and to be used for future expenses such as rental and management payments, are represented by a claim on assets of the RE (or its parent company).

From the perspective of the RE, net cash flows associated with an individual forestry MIS take the form of: (a) initial year net inflow (subscriptions net of establishment costs – marketing, commissions, planting etc.); (b) subsequent year outflows (maintenance, lease payments and other expenses), the sum of which is significantly greater than the initial year net inflow; and (c) final year inflow (recoupment of deferred expenses (item (b) above) from the harvest proceeds). To finance the interim year outflows (b), the RE (or its parent) will need to use its own equity, borrowed funds or the net initial year inflow from newly established MISs.

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If new MISs are used to fund the expenses of, or provide unwarranted returns to investors in earlier schemes, the structure has, at least, the appearance of a Ponzi scheme. Any subsidisation of old schemes, motivated perhaps by highlighting past returns to generate new interest, is not only inconsistent with the principle of scheme investors bearing the risk of their investment but it also exacerbates the risk of the RE becoming dependent on increasing growth in new MISs for survival. While not necessarily a Ponzi scheme per se, if promised returns to new scheme members are excessive, and returns provided to old scheme members are inflated relative to actual underlying returns, a Ponzi-type outcome of collapse is likely.

Part of the attraction of agribusiness MI schemes to retail investors has been the tax treatment afforded to them, whereby subscriptions as well as costs of borrowing to finance investment were allowable – in full – as a deduction from taxable income. Even though eventual harvest returns are taxable income, the deferral effect has advantages. These timing benefits improved the projected after-tax rate of return – and led to concerns that the schemes were primarily tax-driven and, as such, did no more than facilitate projects which, otherwise, were not economically viable. Further evidence of this is the sharp decline in MIS subscription from its peak in 2006, reflecting proposed changes at that time regarding the tax treatment of non-forestry MI schemes.

FIGURE 1: The structure of an agribusiness MIS
Great Southern – growth and failure

Great Southern was founded in Perth in 1987, listed on the ASX in 1999 and, at the time of its collapse (May 2009), was Australia’s largest agribusiness MIS operator with over $2.2 billion invested by 52,000 investors. The group consisted of the ASX-listed parent Great Southern Limited (GSL) and some 34 subsidiaries, one of which was Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (GSMAL) operating as the Responsible Entity (RE) for 43 registered MI schemes.

Figure 2 provides an outline of the relationship between GSL, GSMAL (the RE), and a single MIS, and illustrates the complex nature of the business model. Investors in an MIS paid subscription monies to the RE, often on the advice of financial advisers who may have been employees of GSL (or a subsidiary) or independent, and to whom some part of the subscription was paid by the RE as a commission. (In Figure 2, the overlap of the hatched area, representing GSL, with the icons for financial advisers, service providers and land owners, signifies that these entities might be part of GSL or independent). The funds remaining after commissions and other costs were used by the RE to lease land, establish the plantation or other agribusiness using services provided, or were held by GSL to meet ongoing MIS expenses. Ultimately, when the plantation was harvested (or annually in the case of most mature, non-forestry schemes) investors would receive the proceeds (less some agreed fraction kept by the RE to cover certain expenses).

A further link not shown in Figure 2 is that of a lender–borrower relationship between GSL and investors. By borrowing to finance the investment, the tax deductibility of interest payments prior to receipt of income created a further (negative gearing type) tax benefit, increasing the financial risk to investors. GSL was active as a lender (or arranger of loans) to investors in its MISs, funding these loans by borrowing or securitising the receivables.

Also not shown in Figure 2 is the effect of the company operating multiple schemes, which were established at different points in time. Two consequences of this are significant. First, the assets of any individual MIS are not fully quarantined and so are available for use in other schemes. The MIS investor has ‘ownership’ of a particular lot of trees or other plants established when the scheme is set up. But the residual funds are deposited with the parent company GSL and thus, as a claim on the company’s assets, co-mingled with those of other schemes (and other creditors) of the parent company. Indeed, GSL’s revenue was dominated by new MIS subscriptions. Second, because the GSL business model was built on the ongoing and increasing creation of new schemes as a revenue stream and finance source, problems of attracting new investors could arise if returns on existing/maturing schemes were inadequate. Hence, incentives may have existed for GSL (or a subsidiary), as purchaser of harvests (for on-sale), to apply some new investment inflows to subsidise returns to poorly performing old schemes in a ‘quasi-Ponzi’ type structure.
The nature of an agribusiness MIS, where there are significant operational activities required as well as ‘investment’, creates potentially significant conflicts of interest in the sourcing of those activities when the parent of the RE is an ‘in-house’ provider.

The problems faced by Great Southern were many. Great Southern consistently produced forestry harvests well below forecasts contained in the Forestry Prospectuses. This risk could naturally arise from factors which can broadly be classified as ‘agricultural risk’. A further reason, suggested to the PJC inquiry (PJC, 2009a), was the questionable independence and reliability of agricultural experts used to justify forecasts, and the potential biases arising from the desire for repeat business, leading to the inquiry’s recommendation for disclosure of the qualifications of ‘experts’. However, disclosure may not be sufficient as evidenced by Great Southern’s record of expert-approved, gross overestimates of yield. Independent review of projections is sorely needed, but unlikely to emerge as a market solution and is not obviously an appropriate role for a regulatory agency such as ASIC to take on.

The poor harvests (and poor performance of woodchip prices relative to forecasts) also led to a situation in which Great Southern ‘topped up’ the return to investors in early forestry schemes. Apart from the drain on the equity of GSL through the use of new MIS scheme funds to subsidise early MIS investors, this approach creates a complex interrelationship between GSL and investors in MI schemes. Their returns become linked not only to the performance of their scheme, but also to that of GSL’s overall activities more generally. GSL appears to have recognised the problems in this model when it introduced ‘Project Transformation’ in 2008 aimed at converting MIS interests into shares in GSL. The global financial crisis (GFC) and rapidly declining share price for GSL undermined this process.

The Tax Office’s proposal to change the tax treatment of non-forestry agribusiness MIS weakened investor interest in such schemes, adding a further complication for GSL. Given the importance of new MIS subscriptions for the GSL business model, this was a major problem.

On 23 April 2009, Timbervac Ltd, one of the other major agribusiness MIS providers was placed in administration. Great Southern followed soon after, on 15 May.

Not only did shareholders and creditors of the parent companies face losses, but investors in what many would have expected to be stand-alone MI schemes faced problems. The ability of a replacement RE in administration to provide funding for ongoing maintenance and harvesting was subject to significant impediments due to claims of creditors. For many investors in MISs, the full recourse loans they had taken out from GSL or other lenders were still obligations, even though the MIS investments they had funded were threatened with collapse and loss of value. In particular, if the RE could not meet lease payments, the investor’s proprietary rights in the plantation would revert to the lessor.

Policy issues
As noted earlier, the Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry (PJC 2009a) drew three recommendations from its review of agribusiness failures relating to tax, insolvency administration arrangements and disclosure. The Committee’s more general review of financial products and services (PJC 2009b) made 11 recommendations including advocating greater disclosure and investor education, increased ASIC powers and supervision of advisors, giving advisors a fiduciary responsibility, improving self-regulation, and reducing commissions, and – if all else fails – considering an investor compensation fund. Its only recommendation specific to agribusiness MIS operators was that they be required to demonstrate the adequacy of their working capital to meet obligations.

Subsequently, in April 2010, the Government released proposals for the reform of financial advice, including the banning of commissions and introduction of fiduciary responsibility of advisers (Bowen 2010). ASIC (2010) has also released a consultation paper on increased disclosure requirements for Agribusiness MI schemes based on an ‘if-not-why-not’ approach, requiring schemes with business model characteristics different from those indicated by ASIC as being appropriate to explain why that is the case. But more fundamental issues need to be considered in the light of the agribusiness MIS failures such as Great Southern, Timbervac and, more recently, Forest Enterprises Australia.

First, it is far from clear that the Responsible Entity model introduced by the Managed Investments Act (MIA) is optimal, with inherent weaknesses shown up by the stresses imposed by the GFC. As a model for the operation of an isolated MIS, it may have merit, but where the RE operates a number of MISs the requirement to place interests of investors in the MIS first, and treat all investors equally, is open to abuse. The decision by GSL to effectively ex post underwrite projected returns to investors in early schemes certainly placed the interests of those investors first, but at the expense of investors in more recent schemes.

The nature of an agribusiness MIS, where there are significant operational activities required as well as ‘investment’, creates potentially significant conflicts of interest in the sourcing of those activities when the parent of the RE is an ‘in-house’ provider. As noted in the PJC Inquiry, ‘[t]here is currently potential for MIS to use unprofitable [sic] high cost structures to provide greater tax deductibility to investors, while directing a proportion of
this tax-related investment to related entities charging above commercial rates for project services’ (PJC 2009a, para. 3.122, p. 45). Operational efficiency may be enhanced by in-house rather than market-based provision of such activities, but the question of whether the transfer pricing involved is fair to MIS investors becomes difficult to assess.

Internationally there are a variety of structures for Collective Investment Schemes, all of which aim to overcome the incentive problems, agency costs, governance and information problems that characterise such schemes as discussed in Blair and Ramsay (1992). One such issue is the ability of investors to discipline managers by ‘exiting’ the scheme. In this regard, agribusiness MIS arrangements (with a lock-in period of currently four years) do not meet the IOSCO principles on withdrawal rights of investors (OECD 2001). More generally, the information difficulties faced by investors in an MIS, which involve significant operational expenses and long delayed returns, suggest a need for a strong form of investor protection arrangements. While the RE model emphasises the importance of ‘compliance’ arrangements, that is quite different from ‘performance’ and it is worth examining whether an independent trustee (or other) model would provide greater oversight and be better at resolving inherent conflicts of interest.

A second issue relates to the MIS operator providing or arranging ‘full recourse’, high loan-to-investment ratio loans to investors to fund their MIS investment. Sophisticated investors may be aware of substantial risks associated with the investment such that project returns may be inadequate to repay obligations on such a loan. But such loan-investment packages are not always marketed as ‘high risk’ (despite disclosure of the risks). There may be merit in requiring that loans for investments in an MIS, by MIS operators or associates, be made only on a ‘non-recourse’ basis, such that the security is only the returns on the project rather than the investor’s other assets. This transfers part of the risk of poor project outcomes for such loan-financed investments to the MIS operator-lender, who is better placed to assess such risks, and would likely induce lower loan-investment maximum limits. An alternative solution could be to impose a legislative maximum loan-to-valuation ratio as suggested by some central banks in response to losses on mortgage loans in the global financial crisis.4

A third issue deals with the taxation concessions afforded to MIS investors, which can potentially distort investment decisions. Ultimately, the benefits of investor tax concessions may show up as subsidies to higher cost structure operations and/or returns to operators of such schemes, rather than inducing expansion of efficient investment. There have been numerous complaints about the deleterious effect of agribusiness MI schemes on traditional farming activities, including giving an artificial tax-induced boost to agricultural land prices (see Mackarness and Malcolm 2006), and the merits of continuing such tax concessions warrant review.5

Conclusion
The experience of agribusiness MIS schemes in recent years has raised a number of questions about the Responsible Entity Model used for such schemes following the passing of the Managed Investments Act 1998. We have outlined a number of those issues above, and other concerns such as the role of agents of the RE as salespersons rather than financial advisors were aired in the PJC Inquiry.

While the MIA was formally reviewed in 2001 (Turnbull 2001), the timing of that review arguably gave insufficient time for any deficiencies in the RE Model to become apparent. Given the weaknesses revealed by the GFC, and the significant agribusiness failures such as those outlined above, it is perhaps appropriate for a further review of the Australian approach to the design and regulation of Collective Investments.6

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Notes

1 Other failures have included Environinvest in September 2008 and Forest Enterprises Australia in April 2010.
2 Prior to 1998 an MIS was required to have a trustee, separate from the manager, charged with protecting the interests of investors.
3 Timbercorp, also listed on the ASX, had some 41 associated entities, one of which was the RE for 34 schemes with 18,000 investors who had contributed $1.1 billion.
4 The ASIC (2010) proposals include disclosing and explaining if loans are not on a no-recourse basis, why not.
5 The ASIC (2010) proposals requiring if-not-why-not disclosure of why an upfront payment model rather than annual payment model is used indicate preference for the latter business model, which reduces the upfront tax benefits available to investors.
6 The ASIC (2010) approach to disclosure by Agribusiness MIS schemes assumes the continuation of the Responsible Entity model.

References


